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logging: audit log strings for terseness, reclaiming ~6.8 KB of string data (#11374)

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* logging: strip redundant punctuation, level prefixes, and 'successfully' from log strings

The logger already appends a newline and prints the level tag, so
trailing '.', '!', '...', literal \n, and 'Error:'/'Warning:' prefixes
inside format strings are wasted flash bytes. Same for 'successfully'
(the affirmative form already implies it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: tighten verbose log strings in modules, radio, platform, and system code

Rewrite wordy log messages to terser equivalents - drop filler words
(articles, 'attempting', 'due to', 'please'), use 'Can't X'/'X failed'
phrasing, and abbreviate where the codebase already does (config, init,
msg, BT). Format specifiers and argument lists are unchanged; distinctive
greppable tokens are preserved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: tighten verbose log strings in telemetry sensors and GPS

Same terseness pass: drop filler, 'Can't X'/'X failed' phrasing, common
abbreviations (temp, msg). Specifiers, arguments, and sensor-name
prefixes unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: tighten verbose log strings in mesh core

Same terseness pass over NodeDB, Router, MeshService, PhoneAPI,
RadioInterface, NextHopRouter, and PacketHistory: 'X failed'/'Can't X'
phrasing, imperative verbs, dropped filler. Specifiers and arguments
unchanged; duplicate literals kept identical to preserve linker string
dedup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: 'Unable to/Could not/Cannot' -> "Can't" in log strings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: clang-format rewrap after string shortening

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: restore boot-logo trailing newline and progress-dot strings

The terseness pass over-trimmed: the Meshtastic ASCII boot logo kept its
blank line via a trailing \n, and three bare "." progress ticks were
reduced to empty strings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* Update src/mesh/wifi/WiFiAPClient.cpp

Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* logging: address review feedback on the terseness audit

- Node/packet IDs use the repo's 0x%08x convention in NextHopRouter,
  NodeDB, AdminModule and CannedMessageModule. The sibling log in each
  if/else pair is converted too, so a pair isn't split across two formats.
  next_hop stays 0x%x - it's the last-byte relay hint, not a NodeNum.
- RTC: the read-path and set-path "not found" warnings were byte-identical,
  so the linker deduped them and the log couldn't say which one fired.
  Split into "RTC read:" / "RTC set:". (The four sites live in mutually
  exclusive #ifdef branches, so the RTC family was never ambiguous.)
- SCD4X getAmbientPressure()/setAmbientPressure() logged "altitude", and
  SCD30 getASC() logged "Can't send command" for a read. Both now name the
  operation they actually perform.
- LOG_ERROR already carries the level: ". Error: %u" -> ", rc=%u" (matching
  the existing rc=%d house style) and "Error executing X()" -> "X() failed".
- Typos and wording: "OTA partiton.  (Reason" -> "OTA partition (reason",
  "CST3530 not response ~" -> "CST3530 no response", "Packet received with
  to: of 0" -> "to=0", HostMetrics "Error decoding" -> "Can't decode", and
  the dangling ": " on the NextHopRouter retransmission line.

Printf specifier sequences are byte-identical on all 37 touched lines apart
from the 6 deliberate %x/%u -> %08x node-ID widenings, all on uint32_t args.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jonathan Bennett
2026-08-10 01:02:19 +00:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 5 coderabbitai[bot] Ben Meadors
parent 5692518306
commit cd716fe384
88 changed files with 717 additions and 733 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/mesh/Router.cpp
+34 -36
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@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ bool Router::shouldDecrementHopLimit(const meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
if (node && nodeInfoLiteIsFavorite(node) && nodeInfoLiteHasUser(node) &&
IS_ONE_OF(node->role, meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_ROUTER, meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_ROUTER_LATE,
meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_Role_CLIENT_BASE)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Identified unique favorite relay router 0x%08x from last byte 0x%x", resolved, p->relay_node);
LOG_DEBUG("Unique favorite relay router 0x%08x from last byte 0x%x", resolved, p->relay_node);
return false; // Don't decrement hop_limit
}
}
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ int32_t Router::runOnce()
perhapsHandleReceived(mp);
}
// LOG_DEBUG("Sleep forever!");
// LOG_DEBUG("Sleep forever");
return INT32_MAX; // Wait a long time - until we get woken for the message queue
}
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ meshtastic_QueueStatus Router::getQueueStatus()
ErrorCode Router::sendLocal(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
{
if (p->to == 0) {
LOG_ERROR("Packet received with to: of 0!");
LOG_ERROR("Packet received with to=0");
}
// No need to deliver externally if the destination is the local node
if (isToUs(p)) {
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ ErrorCode Router::sendLocal(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
ErrorCode Router::send(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
{
if (isToUs(p)) {
LOG_ERROR("BUG! send() called with packet destined for local node!");
LOG_ERROR("BUG! send() with packet for local node");
packetPool.release(p);
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_BAD_REQUEST;
} // should have already been handled by sendLocal
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ ErrorCode Router::send(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
if (hourlyTxPercent > effectiveDutyCycle) {
uint8_t silentMinutes = airTime->getSilentMinutes(hourlyTxPercent, effectiveDutyCycle);
LOG_WARN("Duty cycle limit exceeded. Aborting send for now, you can send again in %d mins", silentMinutes);
LOG_WARN("Duty cycle limit exceeded, abort send, retry in %d mins", silentMinutes);
meshtastic_ClientNotification *cn = clientNotificationPool.allocZeroed();
if (cn) {
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ ErrorCode Router::send(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
// p->from as the original sender, so do not rewrite their POSITION_APP payload.
if (isFromUs(p)) {
if (!applyPositionPrecisionForChannel(*p, p->channel)) {
LOG_ERROR("Dropping malformed position packet before send");
LOG_ERROR("Drop malformed position packet before send");
packetPool.release(p);
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_BAD_REQUEST;
}
@@ -652,18 +652,18 @@ bool checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
nodeInfoLiteSetBit(node, NODEINFO_BITFIELD_HAS_XEDDSA_SIGNED_MASK, true);
LOG_DEBUG("Verified XEdDSA signature from 0x%08x", p->from);
} else {
LOG_WARN("XEdDSA signature verification failed from 0x%08x, dropping", p->from);
LOG_WARN("XEdDSA signature verify failed from 0x%08x, drop", p->from);
return false;
}
} else {
const auto bootstrap = verifyFirstContactNodeInfo(p);
if (bootstrap == NodeInfoBootstrapResult::INVALID) {
LOG_WARN("Invalid first-contact XEdDSA NodeInfo from 0x%08x, dropping", p->from);
LOG_WARN("Invalid first-contact XEdDSA NodeInfo from 0x%08x, drop", p->from);
return false;
}
if (bootstrap == NodeInfoBootstrapResult::VERIFIED)
return true;
LOG_DEBUG("No public key for 0x%08x, cannot verify XEdDSA signature", p->from);
LOG_DEBUG("No public key for 0x%08x, can't verify XEdDSA signature", p->from);
if (strict)
return false;
}
@@ -672,14 +672,13 @@ bool checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
// senders emit only those two sizes (perhapsEncode sets 0 or XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE). Drop
// it: a crafted partial signature would otherwise land in the unsigned branch below while
// its bytes inflated the size estimate, letting a forged broadcast dodge the downgrade drop.
LOG_WARN("Malformed XEdDSA signature (%u bytes) from 0x%08x, dropping", (unsigned)p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size,
p->from);
LOG_WARN("Malformed XEdDSA signature (%u bytes) from 0x%08x, drop", (unsigned)p->decoded.xeddsa_signature.size, p->from);
return false;
} else {
if (p->pki_encrypted)
return true;
if (strict) {
LOG_WARN("Dropping unsigned packet from 0x%08x in Strict signature mode", p->from);
LOG_WARN("Drop unsigned packet from 0x%08x in Strict signature mode", p->from);
return false;
}
if (compatible)
@@ -692,7 +691,7 @@ bool checkXeddsaReceivePolicy(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
if (!canonicalSignableSize(&p->decoded, &canonicalSize))
return true; // can't size it; never drop on a sizing failure
if (canonicalSize + XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH <= MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN) {
LOG_WARN("Dropping unsigned packet from 0x%08x that previously signed", p->from);
LOG_WARN("Drop unsigned packet from 0x%08x that previously signed", p->from);
return false;
}
}
@@ -735,11 +734,11 @@ RoutingAuthVerdict passesRoutingAuthGate(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
return RoutingAuthVerdict::REJECT;
}
if (state == DecodeState::DECODE_FATAL) {
LOG_WARN("Fatal decode error, dropping packet");
LOG_WARN("Fatal decode error, drop packet");
return RoutingAuthVerdict::REJECT;
}
if (state == DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE) {
LOG_WARN("Decryptable packet failed decoding, dropping packet");
LOG_WARN("Decryptable packet failed decoding, drop");
return RoutingAuthVerdict::REJECT;
}
@@ -804,7 +803,7 @@ DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
if (config.device.rebroadcast_mode == meshtastic_Config_DeviceConfig_RebroadcastMode_KNOWN_ONLY &&
!nodeInfoLiteHasUser(nodeDB->getMeshNode(p->from))) {
LOG_DEBUG("Node 0x%08x not in nodeDB-> Rebroadcast mode KNOWN_ONLY will ignore packet", p->from);
LOG_DEBUG("Node 0x%08x not in nodeDB, Rebroadcast KNOWN_ONLY ignores packet", p->from);
return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
}
@@ -817,7 +816,7 @@ DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
size_t rawSize = p->encrypted.size;
if (rawSize > sizeof(bytes)) {
LOG_ERROR("Packet too large to attempt decryption! (rawSize=%d > 256)", rawSize);
LOG_ERROR("Packet too large to decrypt (rawSize=%d > 256)", rawSize);
return DecodeState::DECODE_FATAL;
}
bool decrypted = false;
@@ -874,7 +873,7 @@ DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
adminKeyFallbackRefund();
}
if (decrypted) {
LOG_INFO("PKI Decryption worked!");
LOG_INFO("PKI Decryption worked");
meshtastic_Data decodedtmp;
memset(&decodedtmp, 0, sizeof(decodedtmp));
size_t payloadSize = rawSize - MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD;
@@ -888,7 +887,7 @@ DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
}
decrypted = true;
rawSize = payloadSize; // commit the overhead subtraction only on full success
LOG_INFO("Packet decrypted using PKI!");
LOG_INFO("Packet decrypted using PKI");
p->pki_encrypted = true;
memcpy(p->public_key.bytes, remotePublic.bytes, 32);
p->public_key.size = 32;
@@ -906,7 +905,7 @@ DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
} else {
// AEAD already authenticated this ciphertext, so no other candidate could decode it -
// the payload is simply malformed.
LOG_ERROR("PKC Decrypted, but pb_decode failed!");
LOG_ERROR("PKC Decrypted, but pb_decode failed");
return DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE;
}
}
@@ -1014,7 +1013,7 @@ DecodeState perhapsDecode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
#endif
return DecodeState::DECODE_SUCCESS;
} else {
LOG_WARN("No suitable channel found for decoding, hash was 0x%x!", p->channel);
LOG_WARN("No channel found for decoding, hash 0x%x", p->channel);
return (matchedChannel || pkiAttempted || licensedPkiCandidate) ? DecodeState::DECODE_FAILURE
: DecodeState::DECODE_OPAQUE;
}
@@ -1118,7 +1117,7 @@ meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
// If the compressed length is greater than or equal to the original size, don't use the compressed form
if (compressed_len >= p->decoded.payload.size) {
LOG_DEBUG("Not using compressing message");
LOG_DEBUG("Not compressing");
// Set the uncompressed payload variant anyway. Shouldn't hurt?
// p->decoded.which_payloadVariant = Data_payload_tag;
@@ -1156,13 +1155,12 @@ meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
// We may want to retool things so we can send a PKC packet when the client specifies a key and nodenum, even if the node
// is not in the local nodedb
if (wouldEncryptWithPKC(p, chIndex, haveDestKey)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Use PKI!");
LOG_DEBUG("Use PKI");
if (numbytes + MESHTASTIC_HEADER_LENGTH + MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD > MAX_LORA_PAYLOAD_LEN)
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_TOO_LARGE;
// Check for a usable public key for the destination (NodeDB or a pending key-verification key)
if (!haveDestKey) {
LOG_WARN("Unknown public key for destination node 0x%08x (portnum %d), refusing to send legacy DM", p->to,
p->decoded.portnum);
LOG_WARN("Unknown public key for 0x%08x (portnum %d), refuse legacy DM", p->to, p->decoded.portnum);
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_PKI_SEND_FAIL_PUBLIC_KEY;
}
if (p->pki_encrypted && !memfll(p->public_key.bytes, 0, 32) && memcmp(p->public_key.bytes, destKey.bytes, 32) != 0) {
@@ -1173,7 +1171,7 @@ meshtastic_Routing_Error perhapsEncode(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
// On failure encrypted.bytes holds no ciphertext, so continuing would put the plaintext
// on the air labelled pki_encrypted.
if (!crypto->encryptCurve25519(p->to, getFrom(p), destKey, p->id, numbytes, bytes, p->encrypted.bytes)) {
LOG_WARN("PKI encryption failed for destination node 0x%08x", p->to);
LOG_WARN("PKI encryption failed for 0x%08x", p->to);
return meshtastic_Routing_Error_PKI_FAILED;
}
numbytes += MESHTASTIC_PKC_OVERHEAD;
@@ -1289,7 +1287,7 @@ void Router::deliverLocal(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
// broadcast). Mirrors sendToPhone()'s degrade-on-exhaustion behavior.
if (copy)
packetPool.release(copy);
LOG_WARN("Deferred local queue full/alloc failed, dropping loopback of 0x%08x", p->id);
LOG_WARN("Deferred local queue full/alloc failed, drop loopback of 0x%08x", p->id);
#ifdef PIO_UNIT_TESTING
deferredLocalDropped++;
#endif
@@ -1372,8 +1370,8 @@ void Router::dispatchReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
// Fatal decoding error, we can't do anything with this packet
LOG_WARN(decodedState == DecodeState::DECODE_POLICY_REJECT
? "Packet rejected by signature policy"
: (decodedState == DecodeState::DECODE_FATAL ? "Fatal decode error, dropping packet"
: "Decryptable packet failed decoding, dropping packet"));
: (decodedState == DecodeState::DECODE_FATAL ? "Fatal decode error, drop packet"
: "Decryptable packet failed decoding, drop"));
// A policy rejection is attacker-controlled input and must not cancel a valid pending
// transmission with the same (from, id). Preserve the pre-existing fatal-decode behavior.
if (decodedState == DecodeState::DECODE_FATAL)
@@ -1404,7 +1402,7 @@ void Router::dispatchReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
if (p->which_payload_variant == meshtastic_MeshPacket_decoded_tag &&
p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_NEIGHBORINFO_APP &&
(!moduleConfig.has_neighbor_info || !moduleConfig.neighbor_info.enabled)) {
LOG_DEBUG("Neighbor info module is disabled, ignore neighbor packet");
LOG_DEBUG("Neighbor info module disabled, ignore packet");
cancelSending(p->from, p->id);
skipHandle = true;
}
@@ -1416,7 +1414,7 @@ void Router::dispatchReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
p->decoded.portnum == meshtastic_PortNum_MESH_BEACON_APP &&
(!moduleConfig.has_mesh_beacon ||
!(moduleConfig.mesh_beacon.flags & meshtastic_ModuleConfig_MeshBeaconConfig_Flags_FLAG_LISTEN_ENABLED))) {
LOG_DEBUG("Beacon listening is disabled, ignore beacon packet");
LOG_DEBUG("Beacon listening disabled, ignore packet");
cancelSending(p->from, p->id);
skipHandle = true;
}
@@ -1449,7 +1447,7 @@ void Router::dispatchReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
#if !MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_MQTT
if (p_encrypted == nullptr) {
LOG_WARN("p_encrypted is null, skipping MQTT publish");
LOG_WARN("p_encrypted null, skip MQTT publish");
} else {
// Mark as pki_encrypted if it is not yet decoded and MQTT encryption is also enabled, hash matches and it's a DM not
// to us (because we would be able to decrypt it)
@@ -1469,7 +1467,7 @@ void Router::dispatchReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
if (encodeResult != meshtastic_Routing_Error_NONE) {
// Encryption failed, release the new packet and fall back to sending the original encrypted packet to
// MQTT
LOG_WARN("Encryption of new TR packet failed, sending original TR to MQTT");
LOG_WARN("New TR packet encrypt failed, send original TR to MQTT");
packetPool.release(p_encrypted_new);
p_encrypted_new = nullptr;
} else {
@@ -1479,7 +1477,7 @@ void Router::dispatchReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p, RxSource src)
}
} else {
// Allocation failed, log a warning and fall back to sending the original encrypted packet to MQTT
LOG_WARN("Failed to allocate new encrypted packet for TR, sending original TR to MQTT");
LOG_WARN("Alloc encrypted TR packet failed, send original TR to MQTT");
}
}
mqtt->onSend(*p_encrypted, *p, p->channel);
@@ -1504,7 +1502,7 @@ void Router::perhapsHandleReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
// assert(radioConfig.has_preferences);
if (is_in_repeated(config.lora.ignore_incoming, p->from)) {
clearRoutingAuthCache();
LOG_DEBUG("Ignore msg, 0x%08x is in our ignore list", p->from);
LOG_DEBUG("Ignore msg, 0x%08x in ignore list", p->from);
packetPool.release(p);
return;
}
@@ -1554,7 +1552,7 @@ void Router::perhapsHandleReceived(meshtastic_MeshPacket *p)
if (shouldFilterReceived(p)) {
clearRoutingAuthCache();
LOG_DEBUG("Incoming msg was filtered from 0x%08x", p->from);
LOG_DEBUG("Incoming msg filtered from 0x%08x", p->from);
packetPool.release(p);
return;
}