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logging: audit log strings for terseness, reclaiming ~6.8 KB of string data (#11374)

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* logging: strip redundant punctuation, level prefixes, and 'successfully' from log strings

The logger already appends a newline and prints the level tag, so
trailing '.', '!', '...', literal \n, and 'Error:'/'Warning:' prefixes
inside format strings are wasted flash bytes. Same for 'successfully'
(the affirmative form already implies it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: tighten verbose log strings in modules, radio, platform, and system code

Rewrite wordy log messages to terser equivalents - drop filler words
(articles, 'attempting', 'due to', 'please'), use 'Can't X'/'X failed'
phrasing, and abbreviate where the codebase already does (config, init,
msg, BT). Format specifiers and argument lists are unchanged; distinctive
greppable tokens are preserved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: tighten verbose log strings in telemetry sensors and GPS

Same terseness pass: drop filler, 'Can't X'/'X failed' phrasing, common
abbreviations (temp, msg). Specifiers, arguments, and sensor-name
prefixes unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: tighten verbose log strings in mesh core

Same terseness pass over NodeDB, Router, MeshService, PhoneAPI,
RadioInterface, NextHopRouter, and PacketHistory: 'X failed'/'Can't X'
phrasing, imperative verbs, dropped filler. Specifiers and arguments
unchanged; duplicate literals kept identical to preserve linker string
dedup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: 'Unable to/Could not/Cannot' -> "Can't" in log strings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: clang-format rewrap after string shortening

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* logging: restore boot-logo trailing newline and progress-dot strings

The terseness pass over-trimmed: the Meshtastic ASCII boot logo kept its
blank line via a trailing \n, and three bare "." progress ticks were
reduced to empty strings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LBiZc9sfPrH1MZ2L3Fxgt1

* Update src/mesh/wifi/WiFiAPClient.cpp

Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* logging: address review feedback on the terseness audit

- Node/packet IDs use the repo's 0x%08x convention in NextHopRouter,
  NodeDB, AdminModule and CannedMessageModule. The sibling log in each
  if/else pair is converted too, so a pair isn't split across two formats.
  next_hop stays 0x%x - it's the last-byte relay hint, not a NodeNum.
- RTC: the read-path and set-path "not found" warnings were byte-identical,
  so the linker deduped them and the log couldn't say which one fired.
  Split into "RTC read:" / "RTC set:". (The four sites live in mutually
  exclusive #ifdef branches, so the RTC family was never ambiguous.)
- SCD4X getAmbientPressure()/setAmbientPressure() logged "altitude", and
  SCD30 getASC() logged "Can't send command" for a read. Both now name the
  operation they actually perform.
- LOG_ERROR already carries the level: ". Error: %u" -> ", rc=%u" (matching
  the existing rc=%d house style) and "Error executing X()" -> "X() failed".
- Typos and wording: "OTA partiton.  (Reason" -> "OTA partition (reason",
  "CST3530 not response ~" -> "CST3530 no response", "Packet received with
  to: of 0" -> "to=0", HostMetrics "Error decoding" -> "Can't decode", and
  the dangling ": " on the NextHopRouter retransmission line.

Printf specifier sequences are byte-identical on all 37 touched lines apart
from the 6 deliberate %x/%u -> %08x node-ID widenings, all on uint32_t args.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jonathan Bennett
2026-08-10 01:02:19 +00:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 5 coderabbitai[bot] Ben Meadors
parent 5692518306
commit cd716fe384
88 changed files with 717 additions and 733 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/security/EncryptedStorage.cpp
+16 -18
View File
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void writeBackoff(uint8_t attempts, uint8_t bootsSinceFail, uint32_t last
bool ok = computeBackoffHmac(buf.data(), mac);
nRFCrypto.end();
if (!ok) {
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: backoff HMAC compute failed");
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: backoff HMAC failed");
return;
}
memcpy(buf.data() + BACKOFF_BODY_SIZE, mac, HMAC_SIZE);
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ static bool loadDEK()
const uint8_t *storedHmac = buf + DEK_SIZE - HMAC_SIZE;
if (!constTimeEq(expectedHmac.data(), storedHmac, HMAC_SIZE)) {
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: DEK HMAC mismatch - wrong passphrase or tampered file");
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: DEK HMAC mismatch - wrong passphrase or tampered");
return false;
}
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ static bool writeUnlockToken(uint8_t bootsRemaining, uint32_t validUntilEpoch, u
// greater than the persisted value); readAndConsumeToken will
// promote .tokmono on the next read.
if (!writeMonoCounter(newMonoCounter)) {
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: mono-counter persist failed (will self-heal on next read)");
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: mono-counter persist failed (self-heals on next read)");
}
LOG_INFO("EncryptedStorage: Unlock token written (boots=%d, epoch=%u, mono=%u)", bootsRemaining, validUntilEpoch,
@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static bool readAndConsumeToken()
// current value. Equal is the normal case post-write.
uint32_t maxSeenCounter = readMonoCounter();
if (tokenMonoCounter < maxSeenCounter) {
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: Token rollback detected (counter=%u, max-seen=%u), deleting", (unsigned)tokenMonoCounter,
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: Token rollback (counter=%u, max-seen=%u), deleting", (unsigned)tokenMonoCounter,
(unsigned)maxSeenCounter);
concurrency::LockGuard g(spiLock);
FSCom.remove(TOKEN_FILENAME);
@@ -931,8 +931,7 @@ static bool readAndConsumeToken()
if (validUntilEpoch != 0) {
uint32_t now = getValidTime(RTCQualityDevice);
if (now == 0) {
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Token wall-clock TTL unverifiable (no RTC), falling back to boot count (%u left)",
bootsRemaining);
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Token wall-clock TTL unverifiable (no RTC), using boot count (%u left)", bootsRemaining);
} else if (now > validUntilEpoch) {
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Token expired (now=%u, until=%u), deleting", now, validUntilEpoch);
concurrency::LockGuard g(spiLock);
@@ -1041,7 +1040,7 @@ void initLocked()
if (isProvisioned()) {
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Device LOCKED - reason: %s", lockReason);
} else {
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Device NOT PROVISIONED - operator must set passphrase");
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Device NOT PROVISIONED - set passphrase");
}
}
@@ -1145,7 +1144,7 @@ bool provisionPassphrase(const uint8_t *passphrase, size_t passphraseLen, uint8_
// Create unlock token (validUntilEpoch is an absolute Unix timestamp from the client; 0 = no limit)
if (!writeUnlockToken(bootsRemaining, validUntilEpoch, sessionMaxSeconds)) {
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Token write failed after provision (continuing unlocked)");
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Token write failed after provision (still unlocked)");
}
// H4 (audit): seed an attempts=0 backoff sentinel so the file is
@@ -1234,7 +1233,7 @@ bool unlockWithPassphrase(const uint8_t *passphrase, size_t passphraseLen, uint8
if (maxRemaining > 0) {
s_backoffSecondsRemaining = maxRemaining;
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Passphrase attempt blocked by backoff (~%us remaining)", s_backoffSecondsRemaining);
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Passphrase blocked by backoff (~%us left)", s_backoffSecondsRemaining);
return false;
}
}
@@ -1296,7 +1295,7 @@ bool unlockWithPassphrase(const uint8_t *passphrase, size_t passphraseLen, uint8
// Create fresh unlock token (validUntilEpoch is an absolute Unix timestamp from the client; 0 = no limit)
if (!writeUnlockToken(bootsRemaining, validUntilEpoch, sessionMaxSeconds)) {
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Token write failed after unlock (continuing unlocked this boot)");
LOG_WARN("EncryptedStorage: Token write failed after unlock (unlocked this boot)");
}
dekLoaded = true;
@@ -1318,7 +1317,7 @@ void lockNow()
secureWipeKeys();
s_sessionMaxMs = 0;
s_sessionStartedMs = 0;
LOG_INFO("EncryptedStorage: Device locked - token deleted, DEK and KEK material zeroed");
LOG_INFO("EncryptedStorage: Device locked - token deleted, DEK/KEK zeroed");
}
void secureWipeKeys()
@@ -1433,8 +1432,7 @@ bool readAndDecrypt(const char *filename, uint8_t *outBuf, size_t outBufSize, si
// MAX_NUM_NODES pushes the serialised protobuf past that limit.
const size_t maxAcceptedFileSize = outBufSize + OVERHEAD;
if (fileSize > maxAcceptedFileSize) {
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: File %s too large (%d bytes, max %d), refusing", filename, fileSize,
maxAcceptedFileSize);
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: File %s too large (%d bytes, max %d)", filename, fileSize, maxAcceptedFileSize);
f.close();
meshtastic_security::secure_zero(dekSnapshot, sizeof(dekSnapshot));
return false;
@@ -1512,7 +1510,7 @@ bool readAndDecrypt(const char *filename, uint8_t *outBuf, size_t outBufSize, si
hmacData.reset();
if (!hmacOk || !constTimeEq(computedHmac, storedHmac, HMAC_SIZE)) {
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: HMAC verification failed for %s", filename);
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: HMAC verify failed for %s", filename);
meshtastic_security::secure_zero(computedHmac, sizeof(computedHmac));
meshtastic_security::secure_zero(dekSnapshot, sizeof(dekSnapshot));
return false;
@@ -1620,7 +1618,7 @@ bool encryptAndWrite(const char *filename, const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plai
hmacData.reset();
if (!hmacOk) {
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: HMAC computation failed for %s", filename);
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: HMAC compute failed for %s", filename);
meshtastic_security::secure_zero(dekSnapshot, sizeof(dekSnapshot));
return false;
}
@@ -1688,7 +1686,7 @@ bool migrateFile(const char *filename)
// the device.
constexpr size_t kMigrateMaxFileSize = 64 * 1024;
if (fileSize > kMigrateMaxFileSize) {
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: refusing to migrate %s - size %u exceeds %u-byte cap", filename, (unsigned)fileSize,
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: won't migrate %s - size %u > %u-byte cap", filename, (unsigned)fileSize,
(unsigned)kMigrateMaxFileSize);
f.close();
return false;
@@ -1733,7 +1731,7 @@ bool migrateFileToPlaintext(const char *filename)
return true;
}
if (!dekLoaded) {
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: cannot revert %s - not unlocked", filename);
LOG_ERROR("EncryptedStorage: can't revert %s - not unlocked", filename);
return false;
}
@@ -1797,7 +1795,7 @@ void removeLockdownArtifacts()
secureWipeKeys();
s_sessionMaxMs = 0;
s_sessionStartedMs = 0;
LOG_INFO("EncryptedStorage: lockdown artifacts removed - device is no longer in lockdown");
LOG_INFO("EncryptedStorage: lockdown artifacts removed - lockdown off");
}
} // namespace EncryptedStorage