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TMM & Warmstore key source naming (#11119)

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* one becomes two

* warmstore clarify

* Address PR review: key-provenance terminology consistency

- Log line now says "not key-proven" (gate is XEdDSA OR manual, not just signer)
- Rename markKeySignerProvenForTest -> markKeyXeddsaSignedForTest (sets only the XEdDSA bit)
- Docs + test comments: "signer bit" -> "XEdDSA-signed bit"

clod helped too

* Rename signer-proven -> key-proven for broadened provenance predicate

Address PR #11119 review: the copyPublicKey()/copyUser() out-parameter and
the cache-path replay gate now report entry->keyProven() (XEdDSA-signed OR
manually verified), so the "signerProven" name and "signer-proven" comments
were misleading. Rename the public out-param to keyProven, the local
cachedKeySignerProven to cachedKeyProven, and update coupled callers, log
strings, docs headings, and comments to say "key-proven".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* nitpicks

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tom
2026-07-31 10:39:39 +00:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 6367132919
commit e26b6bfc5a
11 changed files with 314 additions and 189 deletions
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src/mesh/NodeDB.h
+4 -4
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@@ -419,15 +419,15 @@ class NodeDB
bool copyPublicKeyAuthoritative(NodeNum n, meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t &out);
/// Key for the inbound-decrypt path: authoritative (hot/warm), or a cold-tier cache key only when
/// it is signer-proven. Keeps unverified TOFU cache keys from backing pki_encrypted attribution.
/// it is key-proven. Keeps unverified TOFU cache keys from backing pki_encrypted attribution.
bool copyPublicKeyForDecrypt(NodeNum n, meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t &out);
/// True if n is a known XEdDSA signer for exactly `key32` (hot signed bitfield or warm
/// signer bit); the key match stops a rotated key inheriting a stale signer verdict.
/// xeddsa-signed bit); the key match stops a rotated key inheriting a stale signer verdict.
bool isVerifiedSignerForKey(NodeNum n, const uint8_t *key32);
/// Key-agnostic "should n's signable traffic arrive signed", per hot bitfield or warm signer
/// bit - hot-only gates would let a warm-evicted signer be impersonated with unsigned frames.
/// Key-agnostic "should n's signable traffic arrive signed", per hot bitfield or warm
/// xeddsa-signed bit - hot-only gates would let a warm-evicted signer be impersonated with unsigned frames.
bool isKnownXeddsaSigner(NodeNum n);
/// Provenance of a bare-key commit that deliberately bypasses updateUser()'s