Files
firmware/src/mesh/CryptoEngine.h
T
Ben Meadors 0e84c1a827 Harden XEdDSA unsigned-packet policy and add coverage (#10858)
Audit of the XEdDSA packet-signing implementation (#10478) surfaced several
issues in when unsigned packets are accepted on receive or emitted on send.
This fixes them and adds regression coverage.

- Unicast NodeInfo exchange no longer breaks against signer nodes: the
  NodeInfoModule downgrade drop is gated to broadcasts, since senders never
  sign unicast (want_response replies, directed exchanges).
- Replace the payload-size sign heuristic with an exact encoded-size gate
  (signedDataFits) and mirror it on the receive side, removing a dead band
  where 167-168 B broadcasts were signed then failed TOO_LARGE.
- Extract the receive policy into checkXeddsaReceivePolicy() and apply it to
  plaintext-MQTT decoded downlink, which previously skipped signature
  verification and downgrade protection entirely.
- Reject signatures whose length is neither 0 nor 64 as malformed, so a
  crafted partial signature can't inflate the size estimate and dodge the
  unsigned-downgrade drop.
- Hold cryptLock on the MQTT verify path (shared Ed25519 key cache).
- Clear any client-preset signature on packets we originate, on all builds.
- Randomized (hedged) signing per the Signal XEdDSA spec: bump the
  meshtastic/Crypto pin to the build where XEdDSA::sign mixes 32 bytes of
  caller randomness into the nonce as Z (meshtastic/Crypto#3), and seed those
  bytes in xeddsa_sign from HardwareRNG (checked, with a seeded-CSPRNG
  fallback). test_crypto pins that repeated signs differ and both verify.

Adds test coverage: test_packet_signing groups A-E (receive matrix, send
policy, NodeInfo backstop, encoding invariants, decoded-ingress policy),
test_mqtt end-to-end downlink cases, and a test_crypto randomization check.
2026-07-02 11:48:58 -05:00

117 lines
4.4 KiB
C++

#pragma once
#include "AES.h"
#include "CTR.h"
#include "concurrency/LockGuard.h"
#include "configuration.h"
#include "mesh-pb-constants.h"
#include <Arduino.h>
#include <memory>
extern concurrency::Lock *cryptLock;
struct CryptoKey {
uint8_t bytes[32];
/// # of bytes, or -1 to mean "invalid key - do not use"
int8_t length;
};
/**
* see docs/software/crypto.md for details.
*
*/
#define MAX_BLOCKSIZE 256
#define TEST_CURVE25519_FIELD_OPS // Exposes Curve25519::isWeakPoint() for testing keys
#define XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE 64
// Encoded size the signature adds to the Data protobuf: 1 tag byte (field 10 < 16) +
// 1 length byte (64 < 128) + 64 signature bytes. test_packet_signing asserts this stays exact.
#define XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_FIELD_BYTES (XEDDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE + 2)
class CryptoEngine
{
public:
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
uint8_t public_key[32] = {0};
#endif
virtual ~CryptoEngine() {}
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN)
virtual void generateKeyPair(uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *privKey);
virtual bool regeneratePublicKey(uint8_t *pubKey, uint8_t *privKey);
virtual bool ensurePkiKeys(meshtastic_Config_SecurityConfig &security, meshtastic_User &user);
#endif
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
bool xeddsa_sign(uint32_t fromNode, uint32_t packetId, uint32_t portnum, const uint8_t *payload, size_t payloadLen,
uint8_t *signature);
bool xeddsa_verify(const uint8_t *pubKey, uint32_t fromNode, uint32_t packetId, uint32_t portnum, const uint8_t *payload,
size_t payloadLen, const uint8_t *signature);
#endif
void setDHPrivateKey(uint8_t *_private_key);
// The remotePublic key parameter takes the public_key bytes container from
// a stored node header. NodeInfoLite is the on-device storage type since
// the slim refactor flattened UserLite into it.
virtual bool encryptCurve25519(uint32_t toNode, uint32_t fromNode, meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t remotePublic,
uint64_t packetNum, size_t numBytes, const uint8_t *bytes, uint8_t *bytesOut);
virtual bool decryptCurve25519(uint32_t fromNode, meshtastic_NodeInfoLite_public_key_t remotePublic, uint64_t packetNum,
size_t numBytes, const uint8_t *bytes, uint8_t *bytesOut);
virtual bool setDHPublicKey(uint8_t *publicKey);
virtual void hash(uint8_t *bytes, size_t numBytes);
virtual void aesSetKey(const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len);
virtual void aesEncrypt(uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out);
std::unique_ptr<AESSmall256> aes = nullptr;
#endif
/**
* Set the key used for encrypt, decrypt.
*
* As a special case: If all bytes are zero, we assume _no encryption_ and send all data in cleartext.
*
* @param numBytes must be 16 (AES128), 32 (AES256) or 0 (no crypt)
* @param bytes a _static_ buffer that will remain valid for the life of this crypto instance (i.e. this class will cache the
* provided pointer)
*/
virtual void setKey(const CryptoKey &k);
/**
* Encrypt a packet
*
* @param bytes is updated in place
*/
virtual void encryptPacket(uint32_t fromNode, uint64_t packetId, size_t numBytes, uint8_t *bytes);
virtual void decrypt(uint32_t fromNode, uint64_t packetId, size_t numBytes, uint8_t *bytes);
virtual void encryptAESCtr(CryptoKey key, uint8_t *nonce, size_t numBytes, uint8_t *bytes);
#ifndef PIO_UNIT_TESTING
protected:
#endif
/** Our per packet nonce */
uint8_t nonce[16] = {0};
CryptoKey key = {};
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI)
uint8_t shared_key[32] = {0};
uint8_t private_key[32] = {0};
#if !(MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_XEDDSA)
uint8_t xeddsa_public_key[32] = {0};
uint8_t xeddsa_private_key[32] = {0};
void curve_to_ed_pub(const uint8_t *curve_pubkey, uint8_t *ed_pubkey);
// Single-entry cache for curve_to_ed_pub conversion (avoids expensive field inversion per packet)
uint8_t cached_curve_pubkey[32] = {0};
uint8_t cached_ed_pubkey[32] = {0};
#endif
#endif
/**
* Init our 128 bit nonce for a new packet
*
* The NONCE is constructed by concatenating (from MSB to LSB):
* a 64 bit packet number (stored in little endian order)
* a 32 bit sending node number (stored in little endian order)
* a 32 bit block counter (starts at zero)
*/
void initNonce(uint32_t fromNode, uint64_t packetId, uint32_t extraNonce = 0);
};
extern CryptoEngine *crypto;